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A commonly applied policy to India's ongoing deple-
tion of groundwater is feeder separation. Introduced
in Gujarat as the Jyotigram Yojana (JGY) scheme, it
provides a separate and rationed electricity supply
to farmers and an unrationed power supply to non‐
agricultural users. JGY is claimed to increase ground-
water storage. By using Gujarat district‐level data from
1996 to 2011 and by separately applying difference‐
in‐differences and Bayesian regressions, we find that
groundwater storage has continued to decrease with
JGY. We contend that our empirical results show that
JGY has been implemented without adequate consider-
ation of (1) a publication bias whereby researchers have
a greater likelihood of having their results published
if they are statistically significant and show a positive
outcome and (2) a ‘barrier’ effect such that communi-
cating evidence across science and policy divides means
that evidence may not be accepted, even when true, and
this limits policy advice and options.
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CHINDARKAR AND GRAFTON 109As scientific facts become more important in public policy, democracy has become more
dependent on scientists for factual information. This vulnerability has made publicizing
tortured versions of facts a favorite tactic for influencing policy. (Kantrowitz, 1993, p. 102)1 | INTRODUCTION
More than half of India's total area suffers from high baseline water stress (India Water Tool,
2017) and very low water storage (including reservoirs and groundwater) per capita
(Subhadra, 2015). India uses some 230 km3 of groundwater per year, making it the world's
largest user of groundwater (World Bank, 2012). In India, about 90% of the groundwater
extracted is used by irrigation—a much higher proportion than the global average of some
40% (Siebert et al., 2010).
Overall, some 60% of the irrigated land in India is supported primarily by groundwater
supplies, and approximately 90 million rural households are directly dependent on groundwater
irrigation (World Bank, 2012; Zaveri et al., 2016). Importantly, more than 80% of the addition to
net irrigated area in India since the Green Revolution has been supported by groundwater use
(World Bank, 2010b) whereas the area in South Asia equipped for irrigation has tripled since
1950 (Siebert et al., 2015).
The increased use of groundwater for agriculture has been supported by supply‐driven
policies that provide farmers free or heavily subsidized grid electricity and pumps (Dubash,
2007; Shah, 2014; Zaveri et al., 2016). This is contributing to an unfolding water crisis (Biswas
& Hartley, 2017) from the depletion of groundwater sources (World Bank, 2010b).
Groundwater development (GWD), the ratio of the annual groundwater extraction to the net
annual groundwater availability from recharge (a higher ratio means greater extraction), for
all of India, increased from 58% in 2004 to 62% in 2011 (Suhag, 2016). Decadal fluctuation in
groundwater level for all of India between 2001 and 2011 reveals that groundwater level
declined in 42% of observation wells with 7% wells showing a fall of between 2 and 4 m and
nearly 5% wells showing a fall of less than 4 m (Central Ground Water Board, 2011). Satellite‐
based estimates of groundwater (Rodell, Velicogna, & Famiglietti, 2009) from three states of
India—Rajasthan, Punjab, and Haryana (including Delhi)—show that irrigation may have
contributed to about half of India's annual groundwater extraction between August 2002 and
October 2008.
Groundwater regulation in India operates through state‐level policies with states adopting
different strategies and combinations of instruments (Narasimhan, 2008; Shah, 2014). The
federal government affects groundwater regulations through the promotion of “Model” forms
of groundwater regulation that operate both on the demand and on the supply side
(Birkenholtz, 2017; Foster, Tuinhof, Kemper, Garduño, & Nanni, 2003). On the demand side,
direct state regulation includes mandatory registration of bore‐well owners, permission for
sinking new bore wells, restriction on the depth of bore wells, and establishment of protection
zones (India Water Portal, 2017). These direct regulations are administratively difficult to
monitor and remain weakly implemented or unenforced in several states (Shah, 2014). Direct
groundwater regulation also includes promoting water‐saving agricultural technologies and
community management of groundwater (Kumar, 2000; Narayanamoorthy, 2004).
On the supply side, groundwater policy measures have included constructing groundwater
recharge structures and also making surface irrigation more accessible (Foster et al., 2003).
Although many demand and supply‐side approaches have been applied to respond to this
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managed projects have potential (World Bank, 2010b), there continues to be serious and
substantial ongoing groundwater depletion across India.1.1 | Indian groundwater‐energy nexus
In 2013, agriculture was estimated to consume 18% of the power generated in India
(International Energy Agency, 2015, p. 84), and the estimate for 2015–2016 was 17% (Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 2017, p. 43). Over the period 2000–2013,
estimated agricultural power demand almost doubled from 84.7 terawatt hours (TWh) to
152.7 TWh (IEA, 2015; Indiastat, 2018, p. 84). Agriculture, however, contributes a much lower
proportion of the revenues to electric utilities (Ghosh & Agrawal, 2015) than the power it
consumes because of longstanding policies to subsidize the price of electricity to farmers
(World Bank, 2001). Power subsidies persist because charging a tariff to farmers is politically
unpopular in India (Chindarkar, 2017; Mukherji et al., 2009).
An energy policy implemented since 2001 in India is the separation of agricultural and
non‐agricultural power uses in rural areas combined with restrictions as to when, and for
how long, electricity is supplied to farms. The key objective of this policy is to increase the
level of rural electrification: Some 220 million Indians in rural areas lacked access to power
in 2013 (IEA, 2015, p. 29). This feeder separation policy has been implemented in several
Indian states (World Bank, 2013) including Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Rajasthan, combining a population of about half
a billion people.1.2 | Gujarat and Jyotigram Yojana (JGY)
Gujarat, with a population of 66 million in 2016, was the first state in India to implement feeder
separation and farm power rationing. The state contributes about 7% of India's gross domestic
product (Government of Gujarat, 2015) and has one of the highest rates of electricity access,
at 94% in 2013 (IEA, 2015). Much of the state falls under arid, semi‐arid, and dry subhumid
climatic zones, and it receives an average rainfall between 500 and 1,200 mm across its various
climatic zones (Government of Gujarat, 2013). Geographic conditions, and poor access to
alternate irrigation sources and technologies, have led to farmers in the state to rely heavily
on groundwater for irrigation.
In 2004, the state‐wide average GWD in Gujarat was 76%, substantially higher than the
national average of 58% (Suhag, 2016). In the same year, around half the districts in the state
were declared as being over exploited (less than 100% GWD), critical (90–100% GWD), or
semicritical (70–90% GWD) in terms of groundwater extraction (Central Ground Water
Board, 2004).
It is estimated that around 70% of groundwater extraction in Gujarat occurs from
electric‐powered farm tube wells (Shah, Bhatt, Shah, & Talati, 2008). The unsustainable use
of groundwater accompanied with poor electricity access in rural areas and weak financial
condition of the state electricity board, prompted state policymakers to introduce the “Jyotigram
Yojana” or “lighted village scheme” in October 2003. This scheme was fully implemented in the
state by March 2008.
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feeders through installation of specially designed transformers, high‐tension lines,
low‐tension lines, electricity poles, electricity conductors, and polyvinyl chloride cables. As
part of the JGY policy, farm electricity supply has been rationed to 8 hr/day according to
a predetermined schedule, which is adjusted for peak periods of moisture stress (Shah
et al., 2008).
Farm electricity rationing under JGY only involves restricting hours of supply. JGY provides
high‐quality power (supporting three‐phase or 415 V electricity supply with limited variability
in voltage and frequency) to farms, which is necessary to operate large electric groundwater
pumps. Prior to implementation of JGY, nearly 80% of the population in Gujarat had at least
some access to electricity, and there was no limit imposed on hours of farm electricity supply
(Census of India, 2001; Chindarkar, 2017). Thus, before JGY, farmers did not have restrictions
on hours of supply although they did suffer from the poor quality of the power supplied that
included frequent power outages and voltage fluctuations. In turn, these power fluctuations
caused damage to pump motors and added to farmers' repair and maintenance costs (Shah
et al., 2008). Importantly, during JGY implementation (October 2003 to March 2008), there were
no substantial increases in farm electricity tariffs (Chindarkar, 2017; Zilberman, Sproul,
Rajagopal, Sexton, & Hellegers, 2008).1.3 | Gujarat's JGY and groundwater extractions
Evidence of the effect of JGY on groundwater extraction is mixed. Studies based on descriptive
analyses claim that JGY has reduced groundwater extraction because of an estimated 37%
decline in the use of farm electricity to power tube wells (Mukherji, Shah, & Verma, 2010; Scott
& Shah, 2004; Shah et al., 2008). Most recently, Bhanja et al. (2017) claim that reductions in the
agricultural power consumption between 2001 and 2016 in Gujarat are associated with an
increase in groundwater storage under the untested assumption that groundwater extraction
is directly proportional to electricity usage in agriculture.
In a rebuttal to Bhanja et al. (2017) and Kumar and Perry (2017) outline uncertainties in
relation to the finding that JGY increases groundwater storage and refer to Dave, James, and
Ray (2017) who provide evidence of an increasing and significant (99.9% level) trend in
monsoon rainfall in Gujarat equal to, on average, some 44 mm per decade over the past century.
Here, using district‐level data from Gujarat, we calculated that mean rainfall for all districts in
Gujarat increased, on average, some 20% from before JGY implementation to post‐JGY (see
Section 2, Data S1). Kumar and Perry further observe there has been an increase in the
groundwater‐irrigated area in Gujarat since 2001 and a rise in electricity consumption in
agriculture since 2006. Both of these trends are at odds with the prediction of Bhanja et al. that
JGY, coupled with other policies, will “… probably start replenishing the aquifers by increasing
groundwater storage in near future”.
Rather than assume relationships with respect to state‐level trends of agricultural power
use or make simple comparisons between groundwater storage at different time periods, we
utilized data on well observations, aggregated to the district level, to empirically test the
effects of JGY on groundwater storage in Gujarat. We employed two different methods. We
first undertook a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) analysis to empirically test the effect of
JGY on groundwater storage, as measured by the depth or distance from the soil surface to
FIGURE 1 Trend of average annual depth to groundwater and rainfall in Gujarat from 1996 to 2011. JGY:
Jyotigram Yojana
Source: Authors' analysis using depth to groundwater data from India‐WRIS, administrative data on JGY
implementation and rainfall data from ICRISAT VDSA
112 CHINDARKAR AND GRAFTONthe groundwater aquifer.1 We then separately estimated, using Bayesian methods, whether
district‐level implementation of JGY determines groundwater storage.
Figure 1 presents average annual depth to groundwater for all of Gujarat from 1996 to 2011.
It indicates an increase in the depth from the soil surface to groundwater (decline in
groundwater accessibility) until 2004 and, thereafter, a variable trend. While the depth from
the soil surface to groundwater decline is coincident with the introduction of JGY, this trend
was not sustained and the depth from the soil surface to groundwater increased from 2008 to
2010, about 2 years after JGY was fully implemented in Gujarat.
The causal impact of JGY on groundwater depth cannot be identified by correlations or
trend analysis alone nor by the untested assumption of direct proportionality between
groundwater extractions and electricity use. Here, and as far as we are aware, we are the first
to empirically test for the possible effects of JGY on district‐level average annual groundwater
depth in Gujarat using either multivariate causal models or Bayesian methods.1.4 | When science meets policy
A common presumption among researchers is that new scientific evidence, as soon as it has
been properly explained to and understood by policymakers, will then contribute to better
decision‐making (Brooks, 1964). This is a “knowledge deficit” model whereby greater knowl-
edge and scientific literacy by decision‐makers and the public will result in better decisions1An increase in depth to groundwater therefore reflects a decline in groundwater level and vice versa.
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characterized as the “linear model” whereby scientific discovery, application, and then societal
benefit follow the use and insights from scientific advances.
The reality is that when scientific evidence is used by decision‐makers to make a choice
between competing actions, the decisions are not simply based on facts (Sarewitz, 2004). Indeed,
policymaking is, typically, more of a values‐driven than a science‐driven process (Pielke, 2007).
This does not necessarily result in poor policies, but it does mean that the role of science is,
typically, subsidiary to values and interests in policymaking. Further, science can serve a
political purpose even when the scientific evidence is provided honestly and competently
(Fischhoff & Scheufele, 2013).
Science and its communication is complex. In part, this is because there can be large
discrepancies between peer‐reviewed studies that may even span orders of magnitudes. As a
result, very different and even opposite policy decisions can be supported by different
science‐based evidence (Stirling, 2010). Thus, if there is divergence over the facts, it is difficult
to have a good decision‐making process (Dietz, 2013).
Overlaying the challenge of effectively communicating science is what facts are reported
and used by decision‐makers (Dietz, 2013). This is exacerbated by the problem of
“publication bias” (Dickersin, 1990). This bias occurs because researchers have a greater
likelihood of submitting results for publication and of having these results published, if they
are statistically significant and show a positive outcome of a treatment effect than when
results are statistically insignificant and/or with a negative or null treatment effect
(Hopewell, Loudon, Clarke, Oxman, & Dickersin, 2009). The publication bias arises, in part,
because of how statistical results are reported and because there is insufficient replication
of existing studies to confirm positive findings are not random (Prinz, Schlange, &
Asadullah, 2011).
A publication bias effect exists in many disciplines (Ioannidis, 2005) and even in the world's
most prestigious journals (Nature and Science). Indeed, based on an interpretation of findings
from multiple disciplines, the lower and upper bound for the average reproducibility of results
could be between 35% and 75% (Camerer et al., 2018). The implications of this bias for Indian
groundwater policy is that statistically significant results, especially those that support existing
policies but are not replicated, need to be treated with caution. At the very least, it demands
an acknowledgement of the scientific uncertainties and the need for ongoing replication of
results reported to be statistically significant.
Another effect that challenges effective science‐policy interface is barriers to communica-
tion between scientists and policymakers (Pielke, 2007), and also across disciplines (barrier
effect). These barriers include differences in language and terminology, interpretation of
results, scale of effects, and methods of analysis (Grafton & Robin, 2005, p. 194). Disciplinary
distance can mean that evidence from one domain is overlooked, ignored, or dismissed in
other domains (Simis, Madden, Cacciatore, & Yeo, 2016). A consequence is that evidence
becomes “compartmentalized” with relatively few links across disciplinary divides. In the
context of Indian groundwater policy, the barrier effect may mean that evidence based on
causal statistical models that are widely employed in the social sciences are not viewed as
acceptable evidence by a hydrogeologist whose preferred source of evidence is, say, remote
sensing data. Thus, rather than “opening” the policy discussion over what are the facts
and developing pluralistic policy advice (Stirling, 2010), a requirement for mitigating complex
problems and even “wicked” problems (Grafton, 2017), the barrier effect tends to narrow
policy options (Pielke, 2007).
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We constructed panel data over a 16‐year period from 1996 to 2011 from 18 districts in Gujarat.
A district is the administrative unit below the state. Data on implementation of JGY were
obtained from the public electricity distribution companies in Gujarat under the Right to Infor-
mation Act of India, 2005. The administrative data enabled us to identify the year in which JGY
was implemented in a particular district. Groundwater, rainfall, temperature, and agricultural
data were extracted from publicly accessible sources. Groundwater depth data were sourced
from the Water Resources Information System of India (India‐WRIS) maintained by the Central
Ground Water Board (2017). Agricultural and rainfall data were sourced from the Village
Dynamics in South Asia surveys conducted by the International Crops Research Institute for
the Semi‐Arid Tropics (2015). Temperature data were extracted from the University of East
Anglia Climatic Research Unit, et al. (2017).
We applied two different empirical approaches to test for the effect of JGY on groundwater
depth in Gujarat. The first approach we employed was DiD that has been widely applied in
“before and after” studies across different disciplines. It employs the frequentist approach when
testing whether or not there is a statistically significant causal relationship in the data. Thus, in
this approach, whether or not JGY affects groundwater depth is determined by the size, sign,
statistical significance, and robustness of the estimated coefficient in relation to the JGY policy.
The second approach we employed is Bayesian estimation that, unlike classical statistics,
begins with a prior, that is, the probability of JGY implementation and then estimates a
posterior distribution using observed data. The posterior estimates, in turn, provide evidence
as to whether the data are sufficiently influential to change beliefs about the relationship
between JGY and groundwater depth.
A critique of the frequentist approach employed in DiD is that the test of significance for
post‐JGY is premised on the null hypothesis (Ho: post‐JGY there is no change in trend of ground-
water depth between treatment and control districts) being true. A commonmisunderstanding for
a variable found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance (p < 0.05) is that this
means there is only a 5% probability the null hypothesis is true conditional on observed data,
which can be expressed as Pr (Ho|data). In fact, it means that only when the null hypothesis is true,
there is a 5% probability that if two samples of a given size were drawn randomly from the same
population, the statistical test would have yielded a statistic as large or larger than the one
estimated conditional on observed data, which can be expressed as Pr (≥data|Ho). As shown by
(R. A. J.Matthews, 2001, p. 46) for a p value of 0.05 to be interpreted as Pr (Ho|data) requires, under
the assumption of normality, that there must be a prior belief that the probability of the null
hypothesis being true is 10% (or probability null is not true is 90%). If the prior belief that the null
hypothesis is true were to be 50%, under the assumption of normality, then Pr (Ho|data) is at least
0.22, and not 0.05 as is commonly interpreted (Berger & Sellke, 1987, p. 113).
The challenge of the frequentist approach is that, depending on the randomness of the data,
the number of observations, data sampling, the nature of the null hypothesis, among other
factors, a p value at or more significant than the standard level of significance (5%) may not
be an acceptable level of scientific “proof” of a statistically significant effect. Indeed, physics
journals accept statistical evidence for a “discovery” only when a variable's p value is more than
10,000 times more significant than the standard 5% level of significance used in most academic
disciplines (R. Matthews, 2016, p. 175). Recognizing this potential “positive” bias in our own
DiD results if we only focus on the p value of the post‐JGY variable, we also employed a
Bayesian regression approach.
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implementation across the 18 districts to test whether JGY influences groundwater depth. Here,
“JGY implementation” refers to the proportion of villages that completed feeder separation in a
given district in a given year and, in our hypothesis, is the key independent variable. The out-
come or dependent variable is the average annual groundwater level (depth from soil surface
to groundwater), in meters, at the district level. If there were to be a relationship between
JGY implementation and groundwater depth, it can only be unidirectional (JGY causes ground-
water depth and not groundwater depth causes JGY) because district electrification was imple-
mented independently of the groundwater depth in each district.
The treatment or policy variable in the DiD estimation is “post‐JGY” that equals 1 for the
year in which JGY is fully implemented (100% of the villages are covered) in a district and for
each subsequent year thereafter. The causal effect was identified from the difference (or change)
over time in groundwater depth between districts that implemented JGY earlier (treatment
districts) and those that implemented it later (control districts). The DiD estimated equation
is provided in Equation (1) below.
Ydt ¼ α0 þ α1PostJGYdt þ α2 ln TotalCAdtð Þ þ α3 ln Rainfalldtð Þ þ α4 ln MinTemperaturedtð Þ
þ α5 ln MaxTemperaturedtð Þ þ α6 ln RoadLengthdtð Þ þ Dd þ Tt þ εdt; (1)
where Ydt is average annual depth to groundwater in district d in year t. PostJGYdt is a dummy,
which equals 1 for t in the year of full implementation of JGY in district d and for each subse-
quent year. A positive coefficient on PostJGYdt would be interpreted as decreasing groundwater
storage as it measures depth to groundwater. TotalCAdt is the total cultivated area under all
crops; Rainfalldt is average annual rainfall; MinTemperaturedt and MaxTemperaturedt are,
respectively, the average annual minimum and maximum temperatures, and RoadLengthdt is
road length. Dd and Tt are district and year fixed effects whereas εdt is the error term.
The challenge with Bayesian estimation is the determination of the prior because the choice
of the prior affects the posterior estimates. Here, we selected the prior as the mean JGY imple-
mentation in all of Gujarat, that is, the proportion of villages that implemented JGY across all 18
districts. This prior varies over time: Until 2002, no districts had implemented JGY (prior = 0.0),
and by 2008 all, districts had implemented JGY (prior = 1.0). These priors were chosen because
(a) they are based on observed data rather than uninformed priors and (b) the empirical
investigation is about whether JGY affects groundwater depth.
For the posterior estimation, we progressively updated our prior and used observed data
from subsequent years. For instance, when the prior was the probability of JGY implementa-
tion, based on mean JGY implementation in 1996, we used data from 1997 to 2011 for the pos-
terior estimation. Similarly, when the prior was the probability of JGY implementation, based
on mean JGY implementation in 1997, we used data from 1998 to 2011 for the posterior estima-
tion and so on. Although the posterior estimate and its credible interval2 from each model are
important, of greater relevance is whether an increase in the probability of the JGY implemen-
tation increases groundwater depth subsequent to estimation using observed data. In this case,
we judged JGY to determine groundwater depth by comparing posterior estimates from models
with increasing probability of JGY implementation.2Credible interval and confidence interval have different interpretations. In Bayesian estimation, a parameter value is,
typically, considered not to be credible if it lies outside the highest density interval that spans 95% of the posterior
distribution.
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effects of average annual rainfall (in millimetres); average annual maximum and minimum
temperature (in degree Celsius); and total cultivated area (in ′000 hectares). We also controlled
for the natural logarithm of the length of road (in kilometres) in each district to proxy for the
general level of economic development and population growth (the Census is the only source
that provides district‐level population figures, but only 2 years of census data overlap with
our time period of study, the years 2001 and 2011) that may have affected the speed of JGY
implementation in a district.3 In the DiD estimation, unobserved factors common to all districts
in a given year were also controlled for through the use of year and district‐level fixed effects.
These unobserved factors may include changes in state‐level agricultural or energy policies
and unobserved factors that may vary across districts but remain the same for a given district
over time such as soil type and the location, gradient, and structure of the aquifer.4 In the
Bayesian estimation, the priors for all the control variables were chosen using the same
informed prior approach as the JGY implementation variable.
An expanded description of the methods used, including tests of robustness, is provided in
Data S1 whereas summary statistics for all model variables are summarized in Data S1.3 | RESULTS
The DiD estimates of the impact of JGY on groundwater level are presented in Table 1. On aver-
age, our estimates show that, post‐JGY, the depth to access groundwater increased by approxi-
mately 3 m (p < 0.05) relative to the level prior to JGY implementation.5 We also checked
whether groundwater depletion was greater in districts with high GWD. The second column in
Table 1 presents heterogeneous effect of JGY by districts that were classified as “exploited.” An
exploited district is defined as one in which groundwater development is greater than or equal
to 90%. Post‐JGY, the average increase in depth to groundwater in exploited districts, is nearly
9.5 m. Thus, contrary to previous findings (Bhanja et al., 2017) or past claims (World Bank,
2010a), there is evidence that JGY is associated with greater, not less, groundwater depletion,
as indicated by surface to groundwater depth.
To test for the robustness of our DiD results, we undertook a series of checks. First, we re‐
ran the DiD regressions using total crop production and total irrigated area instead of the total
cultivated area. Second, similar to Bhanja et al. (2017), we recomputed groundwater depth for a
district by limiting the observations wells to those with at least three seasonal data points in
every year. Third, we checked the sensitivity of our estimates by dropping the district of Dangs,
which was the first and fastest to implement JGY. Fourth, we redefined JGY implementation as
when 80% of the villages in a district had JGY implemented.6 Fifth, as our sample size is rela-
tively small, we used “bootstrapping” procedures to obtain the standard errors. Last, we used
alternate specifications using quantile regression that assigns asymmetric penalties for3Due to limited data availability, we proxy population growth. Annual district‐level population data are unavailable for
India.
4Soil type and the location, gradient, and structure of the aquifer can be assumed to be fixed as these hydrogeological
factors are unlikely to change significantly over a time span of 15 years.
5A 1% increase in the mean average annual minimum and maximum temperature, in linear terms, represents a 0.21°C
and 0.34°C increase, respectively.
6Computing annual cumulative JGY coverage at the end of a given year from monthly data produces a step function.
We, therefore, test sensitivity at 80% cumulative JGY coverage, which is the mean coverage in 2005.
TABLE 1 Effect of JGY and other variables on average depth from soil surface to groundwater (annual GW
depth) across districts in Gujarat
Annual GW depth Annual GW depth
(1) (2)
Post‐JGY 3.009** (1.408) −0.010 (1.819)
Post‐JGY*Exploited district 9.463*** (1.935)
Exploited district 11.859*** (1.068)
Ln total cultivated area −0.458 (2.471) 8.493*** (1.156)
Ln average annual rainfall −0.688 (0.840) 1.638** (0.720)
Ln average minimum temperature 23.256 (60.646) −23.985*** (8.225)
Ln average maximum temperature 146.277 (93.047) 0.810 (10.756)
Ln road length 0.381 (4.494) −6.482*** (1.281)
District fixed effects Y N
Year fixed effects Y Y
Observations 288 266
R2 0.881 0.880
Data coverage 1996–2011 1996–2011
Note. Difference‐in‐differences estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Annual
GW depth = average annual district level depth (meters) from soil surface to groundwater for all observable wells. An exploited
district is defined as one in which groundwater development level is ≥90%. Groundwater development is the ratio of the annual
groundwater extraction to the net annual groundwater availability. Regression in column (2) does not include district fixed
effects as they are perfectly collinear with “exploited district” status. JGY: Jyotigram Yojana.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
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Thus, quantile regression allows us to evaluate the robustness of our estimates to outliers in
the data (see Data S1). In sum, our DiD results using frequentist statistical analysis provide
empirical evidence that JGY has exacerbated rather than reduced groundwater depletion in
Gujarat.
As a follow‐up and an alternative to DiD estimation, we employed Bayesian methods and
estimated 13 separate models for 13 different sample sizes beginning with model (1) where
the prior is the probability of JGY implementation based on mean JGY implementation in
1996. For model (1), the posterior effect of JGY on groundwater depth is estimated using data
from 1997 to 2011. Models (2) to (13) used the same approach but employed a prior for the year
immediately before and progressively updated the prior on the probability of JGY implementa-
tion until the prior was 1 (100% probability) in 2008.
The Bayesian posterior estimates and corresponding credible intervals are summarized in
Figure 2. Detailed posterior estimates are provided in Data S1, which includes the full set of
control variables. The DiD estimates and corresponding confidence intervals are also included
in Figure 2 for comparison. The posterior estimates from models (1) to (13) suggest that as
the probability of JGY implementation increases, groundwater depth also increases. Thus, both
the DiD estimates and the Bayesian estimates are consistent with each other.
In sum, we find (a) with Bayesian estimation, the effect of a low probability of JGY imple-
mentation on depth to groundwater is null, negative, or low in magnitude, which is counter
FIGURE 2 Comparison of Bayesian and difference‐in‐differences estimates of effect of Jyotigram Yojana on
groundwater depth
Legend of Figure 2
Model JGY implementation Posterior/DiD
Credible/confidence
interval Sample
(1) Bayesian 1996 JGY implementation as prior 0.007 [0.000, 0.013] 1997–2011
(2) 1997 JGY implementation as prior −0.019 [−0.026, −0.014] 1998–2011
(3) 1998 JGY implementation as prior −0.064 [−0.069, −0.058] 1999–2011
(4) 1999 JGY implementation as prior −0.020 [−0.031, −0.010] 2000–2011
(5) 2000 JGY implementation as prior −0.052 [−0.069, −0.034] 2001–2011
(6) 2001 JGY implementation as prior 0.778 [0.562, 1.020] 2002–2011
(7) 2002 JGY implementation as prior 0.619 [0.613, 0.623] 2003–2011
(8) 2003 JGY implementation as prior 0.067 [0.018 , 0.117] 2004–2011
(9) 2004 JGY implementation as prior 3.002 [2.920, 3.115] 2005–2011
(10) 2005 JGY implementation as prior 1.452 [1.417, 1.489] 2006–2011
(11) 2006 JGY implementation as prior 2.958 [2.878, 3.046] 2007–2011
(12) 2007 JGY implementation as prior 2.544 [2.498 , 2.591] 2008–2011
(13) 2008 JGY implementation as prior 5.874 [5.868, 5.880] 2009–2011
(14) DiD Post‐JGY (100% JGY implementation) 3.009 [0.236, 5.782] 1996–2011
(15) Post‐JGY (100% JGY implementation in
overexploited districts)
9.465 [6.217, 10.771] 1996–2011
(16) Post‐JGY (100% JGY implementation
using data on wells with at least three
seasonal observations)
3173 [0.294 , 6.051] 1996–2011
(17) Post‐JGY (100% JGY implementation
excluding Dangs district)
3.443 [0.383, 6.503] 1996–2011
(18) DiD post‐JGY (80% JGY
implementation)
2.293 [0.269, 4.316] 1996–2011
(19) Post‐JGY (100% JGY implementation
with bootstrapped standard errors)
3.009 [−0.069, 6.087] 1996–2011
Note. JGY: Jyotigram Yojana; DiD: difference in differences.
118 CHINDARKAR AND GRAFTONto the claim that JGY reduces groundwater depth; (b) with Bayesian estimation, as the probabil-
ity of JGY implementation increases beginning in 2004, there is a sustained increase in the
depth to groundwater; and (c) with DiD estimation, we find a statistically significant
CHINDARKAR AND GRAFTON 119(p < 0.05), robust, and positive effect for JGY on depth to groundwater under eight different
model specifications. In sum, we find using multiple methods and controls, and with the pub-
licly available data that JGY is statistically significantly associated with increased groundwater
depth (or reduced groundwater storage).4 | DISCUSSION
If JGY increases rather than reduces groundwater depth, or in other words, it decreases ground-
water storage, then an explanation for this effect is required. We hypothesize that increasing the
reliability and quality of the electricity supplied to farms, notwithstanding the temporal ration-
ing, supports a “rebound effect” that increases groundwater use (Gómez & Pérez‐Blanco, 2014).
We contend this may have arisen because the cost per unit of electricity remained essentially
unchanged, as there were no substantial increases in tariff, but the power supplied became more
effective and reliable. Thus, the improvement in the quality of the power supplied increased the
farmers' ability to extract groundwater per kilowatt‐hour and, in turn, increased groundwater
extractions. Indeed, in 2002–2003, just prior to JGY implementation, total electricity
consumption for agricultural purposes in Gujarat was 12.97 TWh, and it increased to
13.34 TWh in 2009–2010, just after JGY was fully implemented in the state (Indiastat, 2018).
We evaluated changes in the types of crops grown post‐JGY. We find some evidence that
post‐JGY irrigated area under cotton significantly increased suggesting a shift towards more
water‐intensive cash crops (see Data S1). Further, there is evidence that, post‐JGY, farmers in
Gujarat have substituted to higher capacity, submersible pumps that allow for an increased rate
of extraction per hour (Kumar & Perry, 2018). Both observations are consistent with our finding
that JGY is coincident with a decrease in groundwater storage. Further, we performed a Granger
causality test between mean JGY coverage, that is, the proportion of districts in Gujarat that
implemented JGY at the end of a given year, and average annual groundwater for all of Gujarat
for the period 1996–2011. Our results show that JGY implementation Granger causes groundwa-
ter depth (p < 0.01), which is consistent with our DiD and Bayesian results.
As with any empirical investigation, it is not always possible to control for all confounding
variables. One of these is an increase in new tube well connections prioritized and allocated to
small farmers belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes categories by the Gujarat state
government (Shah, 2018; Shah & Chowdhury, 2017). Additional tube wells and the ease of
extracting groundwater post‐JGY may have jointly contributed to a decrease in groundwater
storage.
Beyond our own findings, the results suggest that follow‐up research is required to test for
the possible effects of policies that promote solar irrigation pumps on groundwater depletion.
This is because of similarities of these policies to JGY, namely, solar irrigation pumps have very
low operating costs, ration power (by sunlight) and provide power of reliable quality. Further,
there are large capital subsidies for their installation (Shah, Rajan, Rai, Verma, & Durga,
2018) so confirmation, or otherwise, of the effects of these subsidies on groundwater depletion
is materially important from a policy perspective.5 | CONCLUSIONS
Our results are restricted to Gujarat, but they are also relevant to other Indian states that have
adopted feeder separation policies, such as neighbouring Rajasthan. Our DiD and Bayesian
120 CHINDARKAR AND GRAFTONestimates provide evidence that the JGY feeder separation policy, combined with an improved
quality in the power supply and no increase in the electricity tariff charged to farmers, has
reduced groundwater storage. If correct, this is a matter of serious concern in a country that uses
more groundwater than China and the United States combined and that has adopted JGY, in
part, as a means to increase groundwater storage, supported by evidence from the World Bank
(2010a, p. 53) and others (Zilberman et al., 2008).
Our findings are important, and not just because of the scale of the groundwater crisis in
India that directly or indirectly affects hundreds of millions of people. The DiD and Bayesian
results call into question the belief that JGY is increasing groundwater storage. Given the
introduction of the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana scheme in 2015, which aims to
implement feeder separation across India (Ministry of Power, 2018), our findings gain even
more policy significance. The scientific challenge is to replicate both our findings and competing
results that purport to show that JGY has increased groundwater storage.
The challenge for the science‐policy interface is to mitigate or overcome confounding effects
that can disconnect scientific evidence from policy actions, especially where scientific results are
contradictory. These effects include (a) a publication bias whereby researchers have a greater
likelihood of submitting research, and also having results published, that are statistically
significant and show a positive outcome of a treatment effect; and (b) a barrier effect that
hinders communication and consideration of alternative policy options, especially when
evidence is developed with different epistemologies and is contradictory.
A practical response to the communication challenges when science meets policy is a
“testing, replication and experimentation” collaboration. Such an approach does not guarantee
better decision‐making, but is likely to avoid “worst case” or “one‐track” policies. It requires
that alternative policies are tested, and where a statistically significant finding is obtained, the
results are replicated. All policies successfully tested and replicated must then be included in
experiments across multiple contexts, before they are scaled out.
Possible policy alternatives suitable for testing, replication, and experimentation in
relation to their effects on groundwater storage include water recharge schemes (Shah,
2005), water law reform (Cullet, 2014), water metering, water accounting (Berbel & Mateos,
2014), and water pricing and incentives for water conservation (Fishman, Devineni, &
Raman, 2015) subsidies for solar irrigation pumps (Shah et al., 2018). Where such policies
are tested, replicated, and are also shown to be successful in multiple and different
circumstances, they may be suitable to be upscaled to promote the long‐term sustainability
of India's groundwater resources.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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